Zhu Yong
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, 401331, Chongqing, China
Fubi Luo
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, 401331, Chongqing, China
Yufang Gou
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, 401331, Chongqing, China
ABSTRACT
Emissions trading as an important system innovation are becoming one of the environmental protection policies which the emerging countries care more and more. But Emission allocation between different enterprises has become a problem of government environmental policy implementation. Effective allocation of emission permits is not only can improve market allocation efficiency of environment and resources also can greatly reduce the government management of the environment cost. The article adopts evolutionary game theory analyzing the competition game process for pollution rights between the two kinds of enterprises whose emission amount is different under the restriction of the environmental capacity. When the government make pollutant discharging enterprises within the area pollution total force limit, pollutant discharging enterprises will compete fiercely for emission amount and eventually tend to dynamic steady state. Clearly, putting forward comprehensive adopting the way of market allocation resources can reduce the pollutant discharging enterprises to the possibility of pollutant emissions.
PDF References Citation
Received: June 05, 2013;
Accepted: October 06, 2013;
Published: November 13, 2013
How to cite this article
Zhu Yong, Fubi Luo and Yufang Gou, 2013. Game Analysis of Enterprise Emission Rights Competition under the Background of Sustainable Development. Journal of Applied Sciences, 13: 5126-5131.
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.5126.5131
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2013.5126.5131
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2013.5126.5131
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=jas.2013.5126.5131
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