Liangqing Feng
School of Economic and Management, Nanchang Hangkong University, Jiangxi, Nanchang, 33063, China
Dali Huang
School of Economic and Management, Nanchang Hangkong University, Jiangxi, Nanchang, 33063, China
Chao Xia
School of Economic and Management, Nanchang Hangkong University, Jiangxi, Nanchang, 33063, China
ABSTRACT
The modular organization is the main organizational model in the future and modular outsourcing has become a new trend. It discusses two kinds of commitment means under the symmetry of information condition, the results cannot achieve the overall and local optimal; and it also analysis three kinds of commitment ways on mass loss under the asymmetric information condition, by determining the a reasonable internal and external commitment to quality loss coefficient, it can make the supervision level of module integrator and the prevention level of module supplier meet to the Nash equilibrium solution and the modular organization optimal solution. The results show that: the modular organization should be borne to establish the appropriate mechanisms to adequate information-shared, choose the long-term strategic partners and to build collaborative networks of modular outsourcing strategy in order to reduce the cost of supervision and constraint and enhance the quality of authority.
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How to cite this article
Liangqing Feng, Dali Huang and Chao Xia, 2013. Quality Constraint Mechanism of Modular Outsourcing on the Mass Loss. Information Technology Journal, 12: 5245-5251.
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.5245.5251
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.5245.5251
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.5245.5251
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.5245.5251
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