Haihong Yu
Maritime School, Ningbo University, Zhejiang, 315211, Ningbo, China
ABSTRACT
To achieve the maximized benefit in service supply chains, an effective incentive to influence service providers behavior is indispensable. This incentive could be implemented via the payment to suppliers. In this study, the optimal incentive payment solution for service suppliers in service supply chains is considered and the impacts of relevant parameters analyzed. The study of incentive payment includes optimal incentive payment function, the precondition of incentive, profit allocation control, etc. The results show that an effective incentive payment will bring additional benefits for the whole supply chain. And the higher the cost of the service providers high effort is the less effective the incentive payment solution is. Also the bigger the sensitivity of market demand to service providers effort level is the further the originator need to implement such incentive solution.
PDF References Citation
How to cite this article
Haihong Yu, 2013. An Incentive Payment Solution for Service Providers in Service Supply Chains. Information Technology Journal, 12: 5719-5724.
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.5719.5724
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.5719.5724
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.5719.5724
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.5719.5724
REFERENCES
- Ahlstrom, P. and F. Nordin, 2006. Problems of establishing service supply relationships: Evidence from a high-tech manufacturing company. J. Purchasing Supply Manage., 12: 75-89.
CrossRef - Akan, M., B. Ata and M.A. Lariviere, 2011. Asymmetric information and economies of scale in service contracting. Manuf. Ser. Operation Manage., 13: 58-72.
Direct Link - Akkermans, H. and B. Vos, 2003. Amplification in service supply chains: An exploratory case study from the telecom industry. Prod. Operation Manage., 12: 204-223.
CrossRef - Baltacioglu, T., E. Ada, M.D. Kaplan, O. Yurt and Y.C. Kaplan, 2007. A new framework for service supply Chains. Serv. Ind. J., 27: 105-124.
Direct Link - Bottani, E. and A. Rizzi, 2006. A fuzzy TOPSIS methodology to support outsourcing of logistics services. Supply Chain Manage. Int. J., 11: 294-308.
CrossRef - Bustinza, O.F., D. Arias-Aranda and L. Gutierrez, 2010. Outsourcing, competitive capabilities and performance: An empirical study in service firms. Int. J. Prod. Econ., 126: 276-288.
Direct Link - Demirkan, H. and H.K. Cheng, 2008. The risk and information sharing of application services supply chain. Eur. J. Oper. Res., 187: 765-784.
CrossRefDirect Link - Ellram, L.M., W.L. Tate and C. Billington, 2004. Understanding and managing the services supply chain. J. Supply Chain Manage., 40: 17-32.
CrossRefDirect Link - Forslund, H., 2009. Logistics service performance contracts: Design, contents and effects. Int. J. Phys. Distr. Log. Manage., 39: 131-144.
CrossRef - Jackson, C. and R. Pascual, 2008. Optimal maintenance service contract negotiation with aging equipment. Eur. J. Operation Res., 189: 387-398.
CrossRef - Kim, S.H., M.A. Cohen and S. Netessine, 2007. Performance contracting in after-sales service supply Chains. Manage. Sci., 53: 1843-1858.
CrossRef - Marlow, P. and R. Nair, 2008. Service contracts-An instrument of international logistics supply chain: Under united states and European union regulatory frameworks. Marine Policy, 32: 489-496.
CrossRef - Sengupta, K., D.R. Heiser and L.S. Cook, 2006. Manufacturing and service supply chain performance: A comparative analysis. J. Supply Chain Manage., 42: 4-15.
CrossRef - Veronneau, S. and J. Roy, 2009. Global service supply chains: An empirical study of current practices and challenges of a cruise line corporation. Tour. Manage., 30: 128-139.
CrossRef - Youngdahl, W.E. and A.P.S. Loomba, 2000. Service-driven global supply Chains. Int. J. Serv. Ind. Manage., 11: 329-347.
CrossRef