Luo Fu-bi
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, 400030, China
ABSTRACT
Dual auditing system can be seen as a system designed to prevent the auditing collusion. The players of auditing collusion are always bounded rationality. Based on the fact of bounded rationality, in this study, the strategy choices of the auditors are studied by using evolutionary game theory. The results are: (1) If the auditors returns of auditing collusion are greater than the punishments arising from auditing collusion, the bounded rational auditors will select the collusion strategy after a long-term of repeated game. (2) Under the dual auditing system both reward and penalty existed, we can maximize the prevention of auditing collusion when the reward given to the non-conspirators is greater than the fine given to the conspirators, and the penalty given to the conspirators is more than the income of auditing collusion simultaneously. (3) Giving more rewards to the non-conspirators can also play the role of preventing auditing collusion.
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How to cite this article
Luo Fu-bi, 2013. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Auditing Collusion under Dual Auditing System. Information Technology Journal, 12: 7661-7664.
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.7661.7664
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.7661.7664
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.7661.7664
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.7661.7664
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