Jianxin Chen
School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, 510641, Guangzhou, China
Yifan Li
Faculty of Applied Mathematics, Guangdong University of Technology, 510520, Guangzhou, China
ABSTRACT
In this study, based on transformation of the attitude between two kinds of depositors we built up the contagion model. Then equilibrium solves and unstable equilibrium solves of the model are discussed on the perspective of system dynamics stable. The critical conditions of pessimism contagion are obtained which were caused by withdraw in advance of depositors. Internal factors were also obtained for bank that was in a crisis caused by liquidity. It is significant to block and postpone the early withdrawal of depositors. At the same time, it can provide theoretical support for us to prevent the banks from the banking crisis and simultaneously it also can keep the bank system stable.
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How to cite this article
Jianxin Chen and Yifan Li, 2013. A Depositors Pessimism Contagion Model Affected by External Cause. Information Technology Journal, 12: 7766-7769.
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.7766.7769
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.7766.7769
DOI: 10.3923/itj.2013.7766.7769
URL: https://scialert.net/abstract/?doi=itj.2013.7766.7769
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